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@renovate renovate bot commented Dec 31, 2025

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
qs 6.14.06.14.1 age confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2025-15284

Summary

The arrayLimit option in qs does not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. Applications using arrayLimit for DoS protection are vulnerable.

Details

The arrayLimit option only checks limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but completely bypasses it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).

Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162):

if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) {
    obj = utils.combine([], leaf);  // No arrayLimit check
}

Working code (lib/parse.js:175):

else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) {  // Limit checked here
    obj = [];
    obj[index] = leaf;
}

The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays.

PoC

Test 1 - Basic bypass:

npm install qs
const qs = require('qs');
const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 });
console.log(result.a.length);  // Output: 6 (should be max 5)

Test 2 - DoS demonstration:

const qs = require('qs');
const attack = 'a[]=' + Array(10000).fill('x').join('&a[]=');
const result = qs.parse(attack, { arrayLimit: 100 });
console.log(result.a.length);  // Output: 10000 (should be max 100)

Configuration:

  • arrayLimit: 5 (test 1) or arrayLimit: 100 (test 2)
  • Use bracket notation: a[]=value (not indexed a[0]=value)

Impact

Denial of Service via memory exhaustion. Affects applications using qs.parse() with user-controlled input and arrayLimit for protection.

Attack scenario:

  1. Attacker sends HTTP request: GET /api/search?filters[]=x&filters[]=x&...&filters[]=x (100,000+ times)
  2. Application parses with qs.parse(query, { arrayLimit: 100 })
  3. qs ignores limit, parses all 100,000 elements into array
  4. Server memory exhausted → application crashes or becomes unresponsive
  5. Service unavailable for all users

Real-world impact:

  • Single malicious request can crash server
  • No authentication required
  • Easy to automate and scale
  • Affects any endpoint parsing query strings with bracket notation

Suggested Fix

Add arrayLimit validation to the bracket notation handler. The code already calculates currentArrayLength at line 147-151, but it's not used in the bracket notation handler at line 159.

Current code (lib/parse.js:159-162):

if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) {
    obj = options.allowEmptyArrays && (leaf === '' || (options.strictNullHandling && leaf === null))
        ? []
        : utils.combine([], leaf);  // No arrayLimit check
}

Fixed code:

if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) {
    // Use currentArrayLength already calculated at line 147-151
    if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
        throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
    }
    
    // If limit exceeded and not throwing, convert to object (consistent with indexed notation behavior)
    if (currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
        obj = options.plainObjects ? { __proto__: null } : {};
        obj[currentArrayLength] = leaf;
    } else {
        obj = options.allowEmptyArrays && (leaf === '' || (options.strictNullHandling && leaf === null))
            ? []
            : utils.combine([], leaf);
    }
}

This makes bracket notation behaviour consistent with indexed notation, enforcing arrayLimit and converting to object when limit is exceeded (per README documentation).


Release Notes

ljharb/qs (qs)

v6.14.1

Compare Source

  • [Fix] ensure arrayLength applies to [] notation as well
  • [Fix] parse: when a custom decoder returns null for a key, ignore that key
  • [Refactor] parse: extract key segment splitting helper
  • [meta] add threat model
  • [actions] add workflow permissions
  • [Tests] stringify: increase coverage
  • [Dev Deps] update eslint, @ljharb/eslint-config, npmignore, es-value-fixtures, for-each, object-inspect

Configuration

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🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

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🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

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@update-docs
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update-docs bot commented Dec 31, 2025

Thanks for opening this pull request! The maintainers of this repository would appreciate it if you would create a changelog item based on your changes.

@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-qs-vulnerability branch 13 times, most recently from dc00f72 to c12f3b3 Compare January 5, 2026 09:55
@LukasHirt LukasHirt enabled auto-merge January 5, 2026 09:57
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-qs-vulnerability branch 5 times, most recently from a64bf94 to b4e2316 Compare January 5, 2026 10:25
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-qs-vulnerability branch from b4e2316 to 688663b Compare January 5, 2026 10:27
@sonarqubecloud
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sonarqubecloud bot commented Jan 5, 2026

@LukasHirt LukasHirt merged commit a2d48e9 into master Jan 5, 2026
4 checks passed
@LukasHirt LukasHirt deleted the renovate/npm-qs-vulnerability branch January 5, 2026 10:44
@LukasHirt LukasHirt mentioned this pull request Jan 7, 2026
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2 participants